Abstract. In this paper, we make a comparison of industry output, inputs and productivity growth and levels between seven advanced economies (Australia,
INTRODUCTION
During the second half of the 1990s, the comparative growth performance of many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries underwent a marked change. For the first time since World War II, labour productivity growth in most countries that have been part of the European Union (EU) for a decade or more (the EU-15) fell behind the United States for a considerable length of time. Whereas average annual labour productivity growth in the US accelerated from 1.2 per cent during the period 1987-95 to 2.3 per cent during 1995-2005, EU-15 productivity growth declined from 2.2 to 1.4 per cent. The downward trend in the EU-15 was rather continuous as growth slowed from 1.7 per cent from 1995 to 2000 to 1.1 per cent from 2000 to 2005. Just like the United States, various other Anglo-Saxon countries, in particular Australia and Canada, experienced a significant improvement in productivity growth during the late 1990s (2.3 and 1.7 per cent from 1995 to 2000, respectively), but since 2000, productivity in these countries slowed down again to growth rates comparable to the pre-1995 period (1.7 and 1.3 per cent in 2000-05, respectively). In contrast, US productivity accelerated from 2.2 per cent in 1995-2000 to 2.5 per cent in 2000-05 (see The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre (TCB/GGDC), 2006).
The striking acceleration in US output and productivity growth since the mid-1990s and in particular the role of information and communication technology (ICT) has been much discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Basu and Fernald, 2006; Botsch and Stiroh, 2006; Corrado et al., 2006; Gordon, 2003 Gordon, , 2004 Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000; Jorgenson et al., 2005; Sichel, 2000, 2002; Stiroh, 2002a; Triplett and Bosworth, 2004) . ICT had an impact on growth through a surge in ICT investment, strong productivity contributions from ICT-producing industries and a more productive use of ICT in the rest of the economy. Notably, the market services sector of the US economy seems to have strongly benefited from the increase in ICT use. Unfortunately, there is much less agreement on the reasons for the slower productivity growth in Europe. Compared with the United States, ICT investment, ICT production and the productive use of ICT in Europe generated less productivity growth during the late 1990s (Eicher and Roehn, 2006; Inklaar et al., 2005; van Ark et al., 2003) . But the reasons for the limited impact of new technology, innovation and structural reforms on economic growth in Europe are still poorly understood. The acceleration and subsequent deceleration in Australia and Canada have also puzzled various scholars (Parham, 2005; Rao et al., 2005) . Cyclical slowdown might be one reason, but there may be other reasons related to short-term shocks, the innovation system and a possible slowdown in reforms in the labour and product markets. This paper extends our previous studies in this research field by providing a combined analysis of productivity growth and levels by industry. The major novelty in this paper is the comparison of output, input and productivity levels in a comprehensive framework. Looking at growth and levels together enables one to better understand the differences in contributions of inputs (labour composition, ICT and non-ICT capital) to output performance. In this paper, we focus our analysis on a comparison of seven advanced economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States). While our present growth and level accounting dataset provides detail on 26 industries (of which 25 are in the market economy), we focus the discussion in this paper on the comparative performance of three major sectors that constitute the market economy: the ICT production sector, goods-producing industries and market services.
We find that a distinction between the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the continental European countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands) is useful. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, market services have been contributing more to labour productivity growth since 1995 than before. Only part of the increase in labour productivity growth can be traced to higher direct contributions from ICT investment. A large part of the acceleration of growth in this sector is also due to higher total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Strikingly, the continental European countries have not experienced this acceleration in TFP growth. Evidence from other studies suggests that this may be related to a more productive use of ICT in Anglo-Saxon economies, although this can be neither confirmed nor rejected on the basis of the industry-level data presented here.
Our comparison of productivity levels for 1997 suggests that TFP levels in goods production are relatively close between countries. In contrast, productivity levels in market services show relatively large gaps for Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom relative to the United States, whereas the continental European countries are at or even above the US TFP level in market services. This raises the possibility that the three Anglo-Saxon countries exhibit some kind of catching-up to the United States, in particular in market services. But it also raises questions concerning the interpretation of the high productivity levels in continental Europe.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we outline our basic growth and level accounting methodology. In Section 3, the data and results of our growth accounts are presented at the level of three major sectors of the economy. Section 4 briefly introduces our level accounting methodology, followed by a discussion of the level estimates. In the concluding section we summarize our main results and indicate the areas for future research.
GROWTH AND LEVEL ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY
The productivity analysis in this study is rooted in the tradition of national accounting, input-output analysis and growth accounting, as pioneered byamong others -Edward Denison, Zvi Griliches, Dale Jorgenson, Simon Kuznets, Wassily Leontief and Robert Solow. Using these techniques, macroeconomic and industry and aggregate measures of output can be decomposed into the contributions of inputs and productivity (see Schreyer, 2001 , for a more detailed exposition). In this section, we outline the basic growth accounting methodology and discuss how this framework is augmented to account for productivity-level differences across countries.
To assess the contribution of the various inputs to aggregate growth, we apply the growth-accounting framework as developed by Jorgenson and Mind the Gap! r 2007 The Authors Journal compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 associates (see, e.g., Jorgenson et al., 2005) . For each industry, gross value added (VA) is produced according to a production function f using ICT capital services (K ICT ), non-ICT capital services (K N ) and labour services (L). Productivity (A) is produced as a Hicks-neutral augmentation of aggregate inputs. The industry production function (industry subscripts are omitted) takes the following form:
Under the assumption of competitive factor markets, full input utilization and constant returns to scale, the growth of output can be expressed as the (compensation share) weighted growth of inputs and TFP, denoted by A, which is derived as a residual:
where v i denotes the two-period average share of input i in nominal value added. Imposing constant returns to scale implies
Capital services are defined as the aggregate of the individual capital stocks weighted by the capital compensation share:
where v K j is the two-period average share of asset type j in total nominal capital compensation. For our growth accounts we use ICT capital services, which are calculated by weighting each of the ICT capital stocks by the share of the asset in total ICT capital compensation. Non-ICT capital services are calculated analogously.
We define the change in labour composition as the difference between the growth of labour input and the growth of total hours worked:
Here, L t is the labour input index, aggregated over the h labour types using labour compensation shares and H t is total hours worked, summed over the different labour types. By rearranging equation (2), the results can be presented in terms of average labour productivity growth defined as the ratio 1. In equations (1)-(5) we drop industry subscripts i for the sake of convenience. 2. This is sometimes referred to as 'labour quality growth' such as in Jorgenson et al. (2005) . However, the advantage of the term 'labour composition change' is that it does not imply that workers with lower wages have a lower quality. Instead, positive labour composition change only implies a shift towards workers with higher wages and, hence, higher marginal productivity.
of output to hours worked, va 5 VA/H, the ratio of capital services to hours worked, k 5 K/H, labour composition and TFP as follows:
We name the decomposition in equation (5) an 'input decomposition'. As we also focus in this paper on the contribution of industries to aggregate labour productivity growth, an 'industry decomposition' measures industry contributions to gross domestic product (GDP) as follows (Stiroh, 2002a) :
where v VA i
is the two-period average share of industry i in aggregate value added. The term in brackets in equation (6) is the reallocation of hours. It reflects differences in the share of an industry in aggregate value added and its share in aggregate hours worked. This term will be positive when industries with an above-average labour productivity level show positive employment growth or when industries with below-average labour productivity have declining employment shares.
Obviously, one can go one step further by combining the input and industry decompositions of industry labour productivity. Labour productivity growth at an aggregate level is then decomposed into input contributions and a reallocation term for each industry:
In a similar fashion, the contribution from industry TFP growth to aggregate TFP growth can be calculated:
Level accounting
Comparing productivity levels across countries is in many ways analogous to comparisons over time. Under the assumption of a common production function across countries, equations (2)-(8) can be used after replacing time subscripts t and t À 1 by country subscripts. Our level accounts differ from the growth accounts in two respects. First, while one typically compares productivity in one year with productivity in the next or previous year, there is no such natural ordering of countries. Therefore, the comparison should not depend on the country that is chosen as the base country. There are various index-number methods that can be used to make multilateral comparisons. We use the method suggested by Caves et al. (1982) . This index mirrors the Törnqvist index approach used in our growth accounting, but all countries are compared with an artificial 'average' country (AC). 3 This average country is defined as the simple average of all M countries in the set. For example, a multilateral index of capital services in country c is given by
the share of asset type j in total nominal capital compensation in country c, v j; AC ¼ ð1=NÞ P v j;c the average compensation share of capital asset j over all countries N and K j; AC ¼ ð1=NÞ P K j;c , the average capital stock. This mirrors equation (3). A comparison between two countries, say Germany and the United States, can be made indirectly by first comparing each country with the average country and then comparing the differences in German and US levels relative to the average country. Similarly, gaps in labour productivity levels can be decomposed by mirroring equation (5):
with v's the input shares in value added averaged between country c and the average country AC. Analogous to equation (8), the contribution of industry TFP gaps to aggregate TFP gaps between country c and the average country is given by
Furthermore, while each country's national accounts presents information about value added at constant prices over time, such data are not available for directly comparing industry value-added across countries. As described in more detail below, our starting point is to measure relative prices ( purchasing 3. In practice, this means applying an EKS procedure to the bilateral Törnqvist indices. The results below are expressed by using the United States as the benchmark country. It should be stressed that the decompositions of equations (5)- (8) 
where w is the share of value added in gross output averaged between the country and the average country, and the superscripts GO, VA and II denote gross output, value added and intermediate inputs, respectively. The relative VA price levels are used to calculate implicit relative VA quantity indices, which are the output measures we use below.
DATA AND RESULTS FOR GROWTH ACCOUNTING

Data
For the growth accounts in this paper, we developed a database on output and labour and capital inputs for seven countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, for 26 industries covering the period 1987-2003 (see Table A .1). 4 The data on value added and total hours worked are based on the most recent release of the GGDC (2006a) 60-Industry Database, while the full industry growth accounts are from the GGDC (2006b) Industry Growth Accounting Database.
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Output is defined as value added at constant prices and is taken from national accounts complemented with measures from industrial and business surveys. Labour input is measured as hours worked defined as the total number of persons employed (including self-employed) times the average number of hours worked. For labour input in each country we distinguish between three and seven types of educational attainment. For our capital input measures, we use data on investment in current and constant prices for six asset types. Three assets refer to ICT goods (computers, communication equipment and software) and three to non-ICT goods (transport equipment, other (non-ICT) machinery and equipment and non-residential structures). To estimate capital stocks, we use industry-specific geometric depreciation rates for detailed assets in the United States, provided in Fraumeni (1997) , in combination with industry shares of these assets from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
The deflators for ICT-producing manufacturing industries and ICT investment have been harmonized across countries as discussed by Inklaar et al. (2005) , except in the case of Canada and Australia, which already use constant-quality price indices to a similar extent as in the United States.
The series for the European countries were published earlier by Inklaar et al. (2005) , but were revised and updated to 2003 using the same sources and methods as before. For the United States, we have developed an entirely new dataset, which is largely based on the latest releases by the BEA of GDP-byIndustry data that cover the period 1947-2004. These data are organized according to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) 1997 classification system and are consistent with the 2003 Comprehensive Revision of the National Income and Product Accounts. In addition to the GDPby-Industry data, we use numerous other sources, most notably industry output and employment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), to obtain a complete set of growth accounts. For US investment we used two main sources from the BEA, namely the 1997 Capital Flow Table and Data for Canada and Australia were developed specifically for the purpose of this paper. In the case of Canada, the new NAICS-based use tables for the period 1961-2001 have been used to construct the output series. These data were extrapolated to 2003 using industry output series.
8 Employment data were drawn mostly from the OECD STAN database (2004 release). Detailed tables on investment by industry and asset tables from Statistics Canada were obtained through Industry Canada. For manufacturing industries, we supplemented those tables with information from the final-demand part of the input-output tables. Ho et al. (2004, Tables 10-12) provide data on labour composition change for Canada, which were compiled in a broadly comparable fashion to our methodology for the other countries.
have to make an adjustment for this. However, it is hard to separate imputed rents from the other output in the real estate sector. Hence, we decided to leave the entire real estate industry out of our dataset. 7. For the United States, no educational attainment data have been collected for years after 2000, so labour composition change is assumed to be zero for the latest three years. 8. Industry output series for 2002 and 2003 are at constant prices. Current price data are estimated using producer price indices for most goods-producing industries and the GDP deflator for other industries. The 2002 input-output tables were released by Statistics Canada after we completed the dataset for this paper.
Output series for Australia are mainly taken from the national accounts, supplemented by industry surveys. Data on employment are taken from Australia's labour force statistics. Detailed investment by industry and asset tables are part of the Australian national accounts, and were supplemented with data from manufacturing surveys to distinguish investment by detailed manufacturing industries. Investment in communication equipment was split off from the broader category (electrical and electronic equipment) using input-output tables. For Australia, we only had access to information from the national accounts on labour composition change for the aggregate market sector from the national accounts. This rate was applied to each of the individual industries.
Industry decomposition of labour productivity growth
On the basis of the dataset described above, measures of labour productivity growth and the contribution of individual industries and major industry groups to aggregate productivity growth can be calculated. Table 1 shows the results of the industry decomposition from equation (6) for the market sector of the economy for the 1987-95 and 1995-2003 periods. 9 The table shows a large acceleration in productivity growth in Australia, Canada and the United States for the market sector as a whole since 1995. Labour productivity growth in France and Germany slowed down substantially, while growth in the Netherlands stagnated. In the United Kingdom, growth also slowed down somewhat, but it remained high compared with the continental European countries.
For the industry decomposition, we present the results for three major industry groups.
10 First, the contribution of ICT production sector, which includes both ICT manufacturing and services, differs between countries.
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The United States and the United Kingdom show rather high contributions 9. The exact definition of the market economy (or business sector) differs by country and organization. We classify government (ISIC 75), education (ISIC 80) and health (ISIC 85) as non-market services, even though some or even most of education and health may be operated or owned by non-governmental organizations. The reason for excluding these sectors from the analysis is mainly due to severe measurement problems in these industries. Moreover, the international comparability of non-market output measures is very weak, which affects the interpretation of differences in growth performance at the total economy level. Table 1 also shows the total economy aggregates, including non-market services, and these results were more extensively analysed in Timmer and van Ark (2005) . 10. Reallocation effects are generally negative, which suggests that industries with an aboveaverage labour productivity level exhibit declining employment shares. In earlier work, such as van , we also distinguished between industries that used ICT intensive and those that did not -based on United States estimates of ICT investment relative to total investment. This approach necessitates a somewhat arbitrary distinction that has been criticized by, for example, Daveri (2004) . More important, though, is the fact that it has become less important to make this distinction because we now have actual measures of ICT use for countries outside the United States. 11. See Table A from ICT producers to productivity growth, whereas the continental European countries take an intermediate position and Australia and Canada show very small contributions. Second, the differences in average contributions of 'other' goods-producing industries (excluding ICT-producing manufacturing) have been very small since 1995. Of course, there are differences between contributions of individual goods-producing industries, but mostly these contributions are positive and small and therefore matter relatively little for the aggregate performance.
Finally, and most importantly, the differences in contributions of market services (excluding ICT services) are quite large between the countries. All Anglo-Saxon countries show accelerations in the contributions from market services to labour productivity growth since 1995, ranging from a 0.5 percentage point acceleration in the United Kingdom to 1.5 percentage points in Australia. In the United States, labour productivity in market services increased by 0.9 percentage point from 0.9 per cent per year in 1987-95 to 1.8 per cent per year from 1995 to 2003. In the Netherlands, market services showed a slight increase in the contribution of 0.2 percentage point, but France and Germany experienced a deceleration of 0.1 and 0.6 percentage points, respectively.
Input decomposition for market services
Using data on capital services and labour composition, labour productivity growth rates for each industry and industry group are decomposed into contributions from ICT capital deepening, non-ICT capital deepening, labour composition change, TFP growth and reallocation of hours worked (see equation (7)). Here we focus exclusively on an input decomposition of labour productivity growth in market services, which are the most intensive users of ICT assets. The results are given in Table 2 . All countries in the table show a moderate to substantial acceleration in the contribution of ICT capital deepening in market services. However, what stands out in Table 2 is the rapid acceleration in TFP growth in market services in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States). Before 1995, TFP growth in market services was negative in these countries, but turned positive after 1995. In contrast, all continental European countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands) showed deteriorating TFP growth in market services after 1995. Germany and the Netherlands experienced negative TFP growth in market services after 1995 and France shows only a small positive growth rate. Table 3 , based on equation (8) See Table 1 . The precise reasons for the differences in productivity dynamics of market services are difficult to generalize. One possibility is that in some countries investments in ICT do not lead to faster TFP growth, whereas in other countries they do. There may be many reasons for this, among which cyclical effects and the effects of unmeasured intangible investments stand out. Estimates of ICT output elasticities that are larger than the marginal cost of ICT capital services would violate a basic growth accounting assumption. However, Inklaar (2005) and van Ark and Inklaar (2005) , in line with, for example, Stiroh (2002b) , find that industry data do not exhibit supra-normal returns. There is even some evidence that it takes a number of years of belownormal returns before the productive returns of ICT become high enough to outweigh the cost.
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The slow uptake of productivity in market services also emerges from studies that take a more industry-specific orientation. For example, McGuckin et al. (2005) analyse labour productivity growth in European and United States wholesale and retail trade in detail. They find that technology adoption in Europe lags behind the United States by several years, which has been holding back European productivity growth. They also find that this lag can be ( partly) attributed to stricter regulations in European countries. 13 But the explanation for the slowdown since 2000 has so far remained unexplained, and more work in this area (for retail and other service industries) is therefore required.
To shed more light on the reasons for the large differences in the contribution of market services to productivity growth, one might focus not exclusively on comparisons of growth rates but also on comparative levels of productivity. For example, rapid TFP growth could point towards catching-up and imitation when starting from a relatively low productivity level. Similarly, stagnating TFP growth at a relatively high level of TFP might be 12. An alternative approach is to directly estimate each of the output elasticities separately. For example, O'Mahony and Vecchi (2005) find super-normal returns on ICT, which they attribute (at least in part) to the returns to unmeasured intangible investment, such as to organizational change or training programmes. An advantage of their approach is that no assumptions about the other output elasticities have to be made, but the disadvantage is that it requires a rather restrictive functional form for the production function (such as Cobb-Douglas) for the estimation (see van Ark and Inklaar, 2005) . 13. For a more detailed statistical analysis of growth differences in the trade sector, see Timmer and Inklaar (2005) .
indicative of a lack of innovation. Therefore we turn to level comparisons for the remainder of this paper.
DATA AND RESULTS FOR LEVEL ACCOUNTING
A level accounting approach to output and productivity comparisons has not been widely applied, which is primarily due to the lack of adequate industryspecific PPPs for output and inputs. PPPs are needed to adjust output and inputs for differences in relative price levels between countries. Because there is little reason to assume that these price differences are negligible between countries or the same across industries, such PPPs have to be industryspecific.
Only few studies have attempted to measure industry-specific PPPs. Most comparisons have tended to restrict themselves to the total economy (e.g., Schreyer, 2006) . Jorgenson et al. (1987) make use of specific PPPs for expenditure categories from the OECD to measure TFP for about 30 industries between Japan and the United States. These expenditure PPPs are adjusted for differences in transport and distribution margins across countries. Other studies have aimed to directly measure producer-price-based PPPs. Van Ark and Pilat (1993) provided TFP-level measures for manufacturing industries in Germany, Japan and the United States using a ratio of unit values that are based on producer quantities and values from production censuses in different countries. Similarly, Timmer (2000) measured TFP for manufacturing in Asian countries using a similar methodology. Mulder (1999) , O'Mahony (1999) , O'Mahony and de Boer (2002) and Pilat (1996) extended the industry-specific PPP approach to measuring output and productivity levels beyond manufacturing. Most studies had to rely on bilateral comparisons of pairs of countries. It has also turned out to be difficult to develop a consistent PPP methodology across the various studies because of differences in data availability. In particular, value added is often deflated by gross output price relatives, without taking into account differences in prices of intermediate inputs (so-called single versus double deflation).
In this paper, we make use of a new and comprehensive dataset of industry PPPs for 1997, in combination with a benchmark set of Supply and Use tables from the relevant statistical offices. PPPs for value added are constructed by double deflation of gross output and intermediate inputs within a consistent input-output framework (see equation (12)). In addition, relative price ratios for labour and capital input are developed. For a full discussion of the new industry PPPs, the reader is referred to Timmer et al. (2006) . For the integration of gross output PPPs and the derivation of input PPPs in a level accounting framework, details are spelled out in Inklaar and Timmer (2007) . Below, we present only the most important elements of our methodology.
PPPs for gross output are defined from the producer's point of view and are at basic prices, which measures the amount received by the producer for a unit of a good or service produced. These PPPs have partly been constructed by way of unit value ratios for agricultural, mining, manufacturing and transport and communication services. For other industries, PPPs are based on specific expenditure prices from Eurostat and the OECD, which are allocated to individual industries producing the specific item. The value was adjusted from expenditure to producer level with relative transport and distribution margins and by adjusting for differences in relative tax rates. Margins and tax rates were derived from benchmark supply-and-use tables for 1997. This set of gross output PPPs for 1997, covering 45 industries at (roughly) two-digit industry level, has been made transitive across countries by applying the multilateral EKS procedure for a total of 26 countries, which are all OECD countries but also includes Taiwan. For this study, the gross output PPPs were then allocated to the 26 industries in input-output tables for 1997.
Intermediate input PPPs are required to double-deflate value added. These input PPPs should reflect the costs of acquiring intermediate deliveries, hence they need to be based on purchasers' prices. Assuming that the basic price of a good is independent of its use, we can use the same gross output PPP for a particular industry, after adjustment for margins and net taxes, to deflate all intermediate deliveries from that industry to other industries. The aggregate intermediate input PPP for an industry is then derived by weighting its intermediate inputs at the gross output PPPs from the delivering industries. Imports are separately identified for which exchange rates are used as PPP, hence assuming no price differences across countries for imported commodities.
To obtain PPPs for capital and labour input, we follow the methodology outlined by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978) . The PPP for capital services is based on the expenditure PPP for investment from Eurostat and the OECD, adjusted for differences in the user costs between countries. The user cost of capital input depends on the rate of return to capital, the depreciation rate and the investment price change. These data are taken from the growth accounts discussed in the previous section. The procedure to obtain a PPP for labour is more straightforward than for capital as it simply involves aggregating relative wages across different labour types using labour compensation for each type as weights. For this purpose, we only distinguish between two labour categories: workers with a university degree or higher and those without. This limited number of skill types is due to difficulties in matching schooling systems across the various countries.
Industry decomposition of labour productivity levels
The first step in presenting our level results is to focus on the comparative levels of labour productivity for the same major industry groups (ICT production, other goods production and market services) as in the first part of the paper. Table 4 shows comparative levels of labour productivity, measured as value added per hour worked. The results for 1997 are for our benchmark year, and developed according to the methodology outlined above. Table 4 shows that the United States shows a labour productivity level in the market economy, which is similar to that of the three continental European countries, ranging from France at 96 per cent of the US level to the Netherlands at 107 per cent.
14 The other Anglo-Saxon countries show between 15 and 20 per cent lower levels than the United States, ranging from Australia at 73 per cent of the US level to Canada at 88 per cent. Table 4 also shows relative labour productivity levels in ICT production, other goods-producing industries and other market services in 1997. The relative productivity levels in market services correspond most closely to those at the level of the market economy, with productivity levels in France, Germany and the Netherlands relatively close to that of the United States, while Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom are at a large distance from the other countries. Productivity levels in goods-producing industries are generally closer together, with the exception of Canada, which has high productivity levels in some resource-intensive and heavy manufacturing industries, like oil refining, metal products and machinery. The high productivity levels in ICT production in France, Germany and the United Kingdom can be mostly traced to communications services, with again smaller differences in ICT manufacturing. Table 4 also shows an extrapolation of the benchmark results for labour productivity in 1997 to 2003. Starting from the relative labour productivity levels for 1997, we have applied the relative growth between 1997 and 2003 at the aggregate and industry group level (see Table 1 ). 15 The faster productivity growth in the United States since 1997 has resulted in lower productivity levels relative to the United States for the other countries, but the cumulative impact is still relatively small over a period of only six years.
Input decomposition of level accounts for market services
The relatively low productivity levels in market services in the Anglo-Saxon economies (except the United States) sheds additional light on the possible 14. The margin of error around level estimates is non-negligible. Although (formal) research on this issue is limited, Schreyer (2006) arrives at a confidence interval of (at least) 10 per cent using a simulation exercise. Strikingly, the relative total economy levels are all higher relative to the United States than to the market economy levels, signalling high relative TFP levels in non-market services in countries outside the United States. These differences are largest in European countries, like France and the Netherlands. As before, when dealing with the growth, it is not clear how to interpret the results for the non-market sector given the substantial measurement problems that remain. 15. The data requirements for a level comparison for one year are quite substantial, and in many cases these data only become available with a considerable lag. As a result, a fully consistent level accounting exercise cannot yet be carried out for a later year than our benchmark year 1997. Extrapolating the 1997 benchmark results forward is also not straightforward since ideally this should be carried out at a most detailed level before reaggregating using the CCD method. As the data requirements for such an extrapolation would be comparable to that of a new benchmark, this is also not feasible at the moment.
reasons for rapid productivity growth in the market services sector for these countries, as was observed earlier. Rapid growth might typically be related to catching-up effects as the industries started from low levels of productivity, and benefited from technological progress, innovation and institutional changes -more than the continental European countries which started from much higher levels. To explore this possibility further, an input decomposition of differences in the level of productivity is useful. Table 5 shows an input decomposition of the labour productivity gap in market services into the contributions of ICT capital intensity, non-ICT capital intensity, labour composition and TFP to the gap following equation (10). For example, the (log) labour productivity gap between Australia and the United States is 39 percentage points, 16 of which 9 percentage points are due to lower ICT intensity, 4 percentage points to lower non-ICT intensity and lower labour composition and 21 percentage points due to lower TFP levels.
A number of observations stand out from Table 5 . First, ICT capital input per hour worked is higher in US market services than anywhere else, and accounts for between 3 and 10 percentage points of the US labour productivity level advantage. In contrast, non-ICT capital levels are higher in the continental European countries, and account for the bulk of the productivity advantage in market services for France and Germany. In Germany, higher capital intensity adds as much as 21 percentage points to Germany's advantage relative to the United States, accounting for more than the total labour productivity gap.
17 This is partly compensated by lower ICT capital intensity and less-skilled labour. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, non-ICT capital intensity in market services is lower than in the US. Labour composition levels in market services are also below the US levels, with the exception of Canada and the Netherlands where it is relatively close to the US level.
The major factor accounting for the productivity gap between the United States and the other Anglo-Saxon countries is the lower TFP level in market services in the latter countries. It accounts for between 21 percentage points of the Australian gap relative to the United States and 26 percentage points of the Canadian gap. In France and Germany, the TFP level is comparable to the United States. Only in the Netherlands, the higher productivity level in market services relative to the United States is largely due to a higher TFP level.
Finally, Table 6 provides an industry decomposition of the TFP gaps in market services relative to the United States. In contrast to the input decomposition of market services in Table 5 , productivity gaps are now 16. The gap here is defined as the difference in the natural log of the levels, to stay consistent with the growth accounts and the decomposition formulae, which are also in terms of logs. 17. The quality of data on investment by industry and asset as well as the investment PPPs are areas for potential improvement of the results. However, any adjustment would have to be implausibly large to account for the high non-ICT capital-intensity level in Germany.
Mind the Gap! decomposed to the contribution of productivity gaps in the more detailed industries; see equation (11). Hence, for example, the 21-percentage-point TFP gap in market services between Australia and the United States is mainly due to the gap in business services, contributing almost 15 percentage points, followed by 'other' market services at 7 percentage points. In finance, the TFP level in Australia is higher than in the United States, so its contribution to the overall gap is positive. There is clear evidence that the productivity level advantage of the continental European countries is primarily located in wholesale trade andto a lesser extent -in retail trade. The Netherlands also shows a productivity level advantage in transport and storage and in financial intermediation. Financial intermediation shows positive contributions from high productivity levels in Australia, France and Germany. Strikingly, business services contribute negatively to the productivity gap relative to the United States for all countries.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we combined a growth and level accounting approach to compare productivity at the industry level among seven advanced economies (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States). Our analysis uses an industry decomposition for 26 industries, of which 25 are part of the market economy, and an input decomposition of labour productivity into the contributions from ICT capital intensity, non-ICT capital intensity, labour composition and TFP. By looking at both growth and levels together, which is the major novelty of this paper, we may get a better view of the extent to which fast (or slow) growth rates may be due to catching-up effects.
Our analysis shows that market services play a key role in explaining the stronger productivity growth of the Anglo-Saxon economies (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States). We also find that the continental European countries (France, Germany and the Netherlands) experienced a strong slowdown in market services. Our input decomposition shows that the differential growth performance is mostly strongly related to differences in TFP growth, whereas ICT capital deepening accelerated everywhere since 1995 -also in the countries with slow productivity growth. 18 An industry decomposition of market services attributes a large role to slower productivity growth in business services in Europe.
The level analysis in the second part of the paper reveals that TFP gaps at the aggregate level mainly emerge for Anglo-Saxon economies (other than the United States), which can also be largely traced to market services. Anglo-Saxon economies, lower TFP levels in market services are the key explanation for lower aggregate labour productivity levels. An industry decomposition again points in the direction of the importance of business services accounting for a large part of the productivity shortfall relative to the US TFP levels in continental European countries are at or even substantially above the US productivity level in market services. The advantage for France and Germany is in part related to higher levels of non-ICT capital intensity, but in the Netherlands higher TFP levels also play a role. The combination of low productivity levels and high productivity growth in market services in the Anglo-Saxon economies (Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom) suggests a role for catching up on the US productivity level. This catching up may be related to a rapid adoption of ICT, which is an input of major importance in market services, and TFP growth. Even though a direct relationship between ICT capital deepening and TFP growth cannot be derived from the industry data as used in this study (Inklaar, 2005; van Ark and Inklaar, 2005) , other studies using firm-level data or specific case studies show that the productive impact of ICT depends crucially on investments in intangible capital such as organizational change and employee-training programmes. But Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) , for example, argue that it takes a substantial amount of time for these complementary intangible investments to have their full effect on productivity. Reforms in product and labour markets may also be needed to exploit the productivity potential of ICT (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) .
The combination of high productivity levels and slow productivity growth in market services in continental European countries may be due to an element of 'perversity' in the productivity performance of many European service industries. This perversity may be related to under-utilization of the consumer market potential. For example, if all the shopping needs to be done between 9am and 6pm instead of having access to retail facilities 24 hours/day, productivity may turn out higher in the former case. As a result of rigid markets, a higher utilization of labour and capital (shopfloor) capacity is realized. These observations raise new questions concerning an old debate on the need to adjust productivity measures for users' convenience, and the adjustment of inputs for utilization rates, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Finally, we stress that, at this stage, caution is needed when drawing far-reaching conclusions from the integrated productivity growth and level comparisons as this type of integrated measurement is still in its infancy. Some of the hypotheses about industry group and aggregate productivity differences are not necessarily borne out by the detailed industry results. Measurement and conceptualization within a national accounts framework still offers much scope for improvement. Some of the detailed industry results suggest there is room to improve the comparability and quality of the underlying data. The dataset for this paper provides a bridge between our earlier datasets on industry and growth accounts and a more comprehensive growth and level accounts framework in the EU KLEMS Mind the Gap! r 2007 The Authors Journal compilation r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 project, which will be published in 2007. The results from the latter project need to be awaited to find confirmation at the level of individual industries and for additional countries of the broad trends sketched here.
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